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in state affairs, reflecting the 21st century paradigms in Turkish politics that evolved from debates of 
democratization to the quest for more power. 
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In 2017, Turkey’s political system experienced one of the biggest trans-
formations of the republican era. As a result of a slight majority (51.4%) of the ‘yes’ 
votes in the referendum that was held for constitutional amendments mostly related 
to the government system, Turkey adopted what is commonly known as the ‘Turk-
ish type of presidentialism’. Both the outcomes and the future of the current system 
of government continue to be discussed in political and public realms. However, the 
existence of these debates and criticisms does not mean that the components of the 
system are unexpected or shocking especially when the evolution and/or direction 
of politics in Turkey in the 2010s are considered.  
The recent studies on Turkey employ particular concepts to analyze this 
evolution of the 2010s. For instance, Esen and Gumuscu use ‘competitive authori-
tarianism’ and argue that Turkey has shifted from being a tutelary democracy to 
having a competitive authoritarian regime in which the political field highly favors 
the power holders although opposition parties participate in political processes such 
as the elections (Esen & Gumuscu 2016). In addition to the popularity of the con-
cept of competitive authoritarianism in the literature over Turkey (see also Castaldo 
2018; Özbudun 2015), different variants of the term authoritarianism, such as elec-
toral authoritarianism in which the multi-party elections exist but serve the ruling 
power have also been utilized (White & Herzog 2016). The theoretical concepts 
dealing with Turkey’s late 2010s are various (e.g., on illiberal governance see Öktem 
& Akkoyunlu 2016). Majority of this conceptually abundant literature also empha-
size that the transformation is not Turkey-specific. Instead, it is a part of the global 
phenomenon in which liberal democracies or democracies are on decline (see 
Somer 2016).  
These analytical tools that shed light upon the latest years of Turkish poli-
tics are important in order to grasp the recent events in Turkey, including the trans-
formation of the government system from parliamentarism to presidentialism. 
However, the problematic of the government system in Turkey also transcends the 
2010s, indicating the necessity to deal with this specific issue from a broader per-




spective. In other words, the nature of the Turkish regime of the recent context is 
helpful especially to make sense of the way that these constitutional amendments 
were made and accepted, and to make sense of the scope and content of the new 
system, which has been associated with the term ‘hyper-presidentialism’ by many 
(see Özsoy Boyunsuz 2016), yet an analysis about the quest for a change in the gov-
ernment system also necessitates a longer term approach.  
This article aims to provide such a narrative. On the one hand, it shows 
that the issue dates back to the late 20th century, during which different political ac-
tors discussed and demanded the presidential system of government with distinct 
purposes. On the other hand, it focuses on the first decade of the 21st century par-
ticularly with respect to the AKP (Justice and Development Party), suggesting that 
the transition to the presidential system was already on the agenda of the party. At 
that time, the AKP, despite its strength in the parliament, was not very powerful 
vis-à-vis the specific institutions of the state such as the army or the Constitutional 
Court. Therefore, the government restructuring discourse was based on the notion 
of clashing the tutelary aspect of the state. However, as the AKP gained strength in 
relation to the aforementioned institutions, its discourse about the government sys-
tem changed towards efficiency and persistence in state affairs. This article argues 
that the discourses on presidentialism in Turkey reflect the 21st century paradigms in 
Turkish politics that evolved from the debates of democratization to the quest for 
more power. 
 
2. A Historical Glance at the Presidentialism Debates in Turkey  
When scholars discuss the presidentialism vs. parliamentarism problematic 
in Turkey, they usually refer to the late 1980s and 1990s – the presidency of Turgut 
Özal and Süleyman Demirel respectively – as the originating point for the discus-
sion. This understanding makes sense given the quest of Özal and Demirel for a 
presidential system, which had led to vivid discussions in the political and public 
realms, as will be shown below. However, it should be emphasized that the presi-
dentialism discussions precede these two presidents. Even in the 1970s, there were 
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political parties that defended the idea of presidential system. Not being very sur-
prising, one of these parties was the MSP (the National Salvation Party), as the party 
of the Islamist Milli Görüş movement (The National Outlook) that the ideology and 
the establishment of the AKP largely depended on. In one of its election pamphlets, 
the MSP promised presidential type of government to the electorate, together with a 
popularly elected president for an efficient rule (Milli Selamet Partisi Seçim Beyan-
namesi 1973).  
The political deadlock, acute economic crisis and the upsurge of the politi-
cal violence in the late 1970s paved way for the 1980 coup d’etat (Sayarı 2010), start-
ing a new epoch in Turkish politics. The military intended to transform the political 
system radically, changing the work done by the previous coup of 1960 essentially 
(Zürcher 2004). The reference point for the military was the system brought by the 
1961 Constitution which was regarded as the major reason for political fragmenta-
tion and polarization as the constitution strengthened the smaller parties in the sys-
tem and politicized the masses with the enhancement of liberties. Although there 
was another military intervention – military memorandum of 1971 – and an interim 
period thereafter that had brought constitutional changes curtailing the freedoms of 
the 1961 Constitution, many factions in politics of Turkey continued to consider 
this constitution as the major reason for the systemic crisis and the quasi-civil war in 
the last years of the 1970s. Therefore, the junta of the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey 
aimed to restructure the system drastically with a new constitution that would sup-
posedly bring stability to the country.  
Wide-ranging criticisms can be made about the 1982 Constitution, from its 
content that protects the state vis-à-vis the individual, to the process that it was 
made and approved. However, specifically two issues should be highlighted given 
the subject of this article. First of all, the powers of the president were expanded in 
the 1982 Constitution. The constitution makers had supposed that the presidency 
would incessantly be filled by the soldiers (Özbudun & Gençkaya 2009, pp. 20-21). 
According to the 1982 Constitution, president remained politically unaccountable 
yet gained many executive functions, leaving the ceremonial and inactive position 




formulated by the 1961 Constitution behind (Özbudun 2012, p. 198). This political-
ly unaccountable but powerful president would be emphasized as a paradoxical situ-
ation in a parliamentary system, whenever the political system of Turkey was dis-
cussed later on, including the failed constitution making process of the early 2010s.  
The second point about the constitution-making process was closely relat-
ed to this first point of increasing presidential powers. It is seen that the political 
system was not solely discussed with regard to the changing balance between the 
executive and legislative, or the balance inside the executive within a parliamentary 
system. Instead, the change of the government system was another option on the 
table, yet without many supporters. While some of the members of the constituent 
council had offered presidential system of government emphasizing an alleged evo-
lution of the systems from parliamentarism to presidentialism on a global scale; the 
others proposed a system which could be understood some form in between (Milli-
yet 1982, p. 1). As stated above, the majority of the constitution makers, specifically, 
the head of the commission, Orhan Aldıkaçtı was against presidentialism on the 
grounds that it could be exploited by political parties and ambitious leaders (Milliyet 
1982, p. 1). The possible repercussions that a presidential system could bring about 
had also been stressed by a report written by the Ankara University’s professors, 
who suggested that a quest for authority to solve the problems of politics could 
eventually turn into a system counter to the basic characteristics of the regime 
(Milliyet 1981, p. 12).  
Although a parliamentary system was accepted with a relatively powerful 
president in the end, the debates about the system of government did not come to 
an end in Turkey. On the contrary, they intensified with Özal, who frankly espoused 
the idea. Özal, the founder of the center right ANAP (Motherland Party), headed 
two one-party governments as the Prime Minister of Turkey after his party’s victory 
in both 1983 and 1987 elections. He calculated constitutional changes for a presi-
dential system during his premiership for his future ambitions for presidency 
(Soysal 1986, p. 2), yet with no success. Özal became the eighth president of the 
Republic of Turkey in 1989 within the ‘confines’ of the parliamentary system. How-
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ever, despite the presidency was formulated as an impartial post by the 1982 Consti-
tution, Özal continued to act as if he was the leader of the ANAP and prime minis-
ter, by giving instructions to the government and criticizing it when he was not re-
ferred to (Heper & Çinar 1996).  
In order to overcome this supposed systemic discord that had actually 
been created and aggravated by the president himself, Özal demanded constitutional 
changes that would bring presidentialism. His quest for more power paved the way 
for wide-ranging discussions – mostly critical towards presidentialism – in Turkish 
politics and society. For instance, in a major conference held by Mülkiyeliler Birliği, to 
which President Özal, Prime Minister Akbulut, and other party leaders attended to-
gether with academics and civil society representatives, only the President and 
Prime Minister had defended the presidential form of government while the re-
maining participants opposed the idea on the grounds that it had a potential to lead 
the country into a dictatorship in the future (Milliyet 1990, p. 6).  
Özal had not realized his aim of presidentialism when he suddenly died in 
1993. The leader of the DYP (the True Path Party), Süleyman Demirel, who was al-
so a well-known political figure of the 1960s and 1970s, was elected president by the 
parliament. As opposed to Özal, his successor Demirel was regarded as respectful 
for his constitutional rights, mostly interested in the political stability (Heper & 
Çinar 1996). However, the 1990s of Turkey had everything but stability. First, the 
country was politically fragmented and ruled by unstable coalition governments 
throughout the decade. Second, the aforementioned Islamist Milli Görüş movement 
gained strength with the RP (Welfare Party) which became a coalition partner. The 
rising Islamism was reacted by another military intervention that was called ‘post-
modern’ coup of 28 February, which did not seize political power but rather over-
threw the government with a secularist agenda. Third, in the Southeastern Anatolia, 
the state security forces clashed with the separatist PKK, creating a low intensity 
war in Southeastern Anatolia as the top Turkish military officials named. Last but 
not least, all of these political problems were exacerbated by the several economic 
crises.  




Even though the president Demirel had opposed to the Özal’s idea of 
presidentialism in the beginning of the 1990s, he started to talk about the need for 
the transformation of the relationship between the legislative and executive for the 
sake of political stability (TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanakları 1997). It is seen that the 
debates over the presidential form of government never fell from the agenda during 
the 1990s, constantly discussed by the politicians as well as newspapers, civil society 
organizations, and academic circles. In the latter realm, two issues have been mostly 
emphasized: First, the only successful example of the presidential system was the 
U.S., which had totally different political, economic and social conditions than those 
of Turkey. Second, the political problems of Turkey did not stem from the govern-
ment system itself, instead, from the oligarchic political parties and problematic 
electoral systems (Milliyet 1995, p. 21; Milliyet 1997, p. 22). It is important to note 
that the content of these discussions over the presidential system of government 
during the 1990s has strong resemblances with those of the 2010s, emphases being 
made on the party systems, elections, political culture, and the possible dangers that 
the presidential system could pose to the country in the hands of a president with 
authoritarian tendencies.   
The presidential system was not realized in the contexts of the 1980s and 
1990s, although it was discussed at short intervals. Apart from the above-mentioned 
similarities of the discussions from the 1980s to the 2010s; several evaluations 
should be drawn to help the following analyses of the 21st century systemic trans-
formation of Turkey. In this regard, the 1982 Constitution seemed to fail in formu-
lating an ideal type of parliamentary government system, specifically flawed with re-
spect to the position of president. In other words, the constitution created a presi-
dency with executive powers, yet without political accountability. The parliamentary 
system with a president having more than a ceremonial role negatively impacted on 
the relationship between the president and the prime minister together with her/his 
cabinet.  
In fact, as the previous narrative told, some of the constitution makers had 
searched for a stronger president, even a presidential system – as mostly associated 
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with Özal – during the constitution making process. However, what differentiates 
Özal in this respect, was the fact that while the reference point for these constitu-
tion makers – and later for Demirel – was the political fragmentation of the 1970s 
and 1990s respectively; the discourses about efficient decision-making process dom-
inated the era of Özal. All of these arguments used by the proponents and the op-
ponents of the presidential system in the late 20th century were re-used also in the 
21st century, surely within a different context that would be influenced first by an 
ideological conflict among the different actors of the state and then by rising au-
thoritarianism of the AKP. The next section will analyze the beginning of this new 
context, which also brought another systemic crisis that resulted in the popular elec-
tion of the president in 2007.  
 
3. Clash between the old and the new: 2007 Constitutional Crisis over the 
Presidency  
In November 2002 elections, the AKP took the 34.28% of the total votes 
with 363 seats in the parliament (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2002), ending the era of the 
coalitions for Turkey that had become the norm in the 1990s. The party had been 
founded in 2001 when Turkey was struggling with the worst economic crisis it faced 
after the World War II. As suggested above, The AKP had its roots in Milli Görüş 
with respect to both its cadres and ideology although it was also an important at-
tempt to break away from this tradition, with an emphasis more on center-right fea-
tures (Atacan 2005, p. 197). This break from the traditional Islamist politics was 
closely related to the experience of the RP that had been forced to resign after 28 
February 1997 decisions of the National Security Council as called ‘post-modern 
coup’, and had been subsequently closed by the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that the party had acted against notion of secularism.  
As Hale argues, the AKP had to find a balance between the Islamist pro-
ject of the RP, to wit, the Milli Görüş that the new party’s cadres once belonged, and 
secularist state institutions such as military, judiciary and bureaucracy in general 
(Hale 2005, p. 301). It seemed to be the only way to ‘survive’ in the political envi-




ronment of Turkey. As a result, the party adopted a discourse of democratization 
together with the target of the EU membership, thus, trying to appeal to the state 
and the secular segments of the society as well as to provide a political framework 
that would enhance the religious freedoms and diminish the impact of the army on 
politics at the same time (Arat & Pamuk 2019, p. 97). In the first term of the AKP, 
the economy performed well, various reform packages on the way to the EU were 
passed paving the way for the alleviation of the military tutelage and the several 
openings such as Kurdish one, and took other initiatives such as women friendly 
penal code (Toprak 2012, p. 222). 
However, it should also be stressed that despite the discourse of the ideo-
logical transformation of the AKP, the relationship between the party and the secu-
larist state institutions remained conflictual. The most important turning point that 
revealed this clash became the constitutional crisis of 2007, which was related to the 
presidency in a direct manner. In fact, it was this crisis, with its results, that paved 
the way for presidential system of government in Turkey later on. However, it 
should also be emphasized that the public and political discussions of the time show 
that presidential system had already been existent on the mind of the AKP mem-
bers, including the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the influential 
figure of the party, Bülent Arınç.  
In 2003, Burhan Kuzu, the then head of the Constitutional Commission in 
the parliament, started the discussion of presidentialism. Erdoğan supported Kuzu 
in this respect, suggesting that the presidential system should have really been con-
sidered since there were conflicts between the state institutions (Milliyet 2004, p. 
26). The conflicts that Erdoğan implied were between his government and the pres-
idency, the higher judiciary, and surely the military, which were regarded by the 
AKP as bureaucratic oligarchy. In this respect, Erdoğan suggested the American 
type of presidentialism (Tamer 2005, p. 6), whose separation of powers would help 
the government in its endeavor to clash with this bureaucratic oligarchy. In other 
words, the idea of presidential system in the context of 2002–2007 was directly re-
lated to the democratization discourse of the AKP, which had aimed to decrease the 
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power of the institutions associated with Kemalism. However, it was not easy to 
impose such a grand change at that time, as Bülent Arınç openly suggested that the 
AKP should have suspended these debates for two legislative terms since Turkey 
was not ready for a government system change yet (Tamer 2005, p. 6). The 2007 
presidential elections, in this respect, constituted not only a crisis but also an oppor-
tunity for the AKP.  
In 2007, the then president Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s term would come to an 
end. The election of presidents in Turkey, which had been executed by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TGNA) until 2014, had always been stressful since it 
necessitated compromise on a person who was expected to be an impartial head of 
state. Surely, the above-mentioned clash between the AKP and the secularist state 
organs together with the main opposition, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) ex-
acerbated the already troublesome process. Therefore, in the late 2006, Turkish pol-
itics and also public opinion had focused on two interrelated issues: the possible 
candidates for the Turkish presidency, specifically the position of the then Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, and the different legal opinions about the electoral process which 
had been started by the former Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
Sabih Kanadoğlu.  
Kanadoğlu started a significant discussion in politics as well as judiciary by 
suggesting that meeting quorum for the presidential election for the first and second 
rounds was the two-third of the parliament (367), not one-third (184) as suggested 
by many (Milliyet 2006, p. 18). As Özbudun and Gençkaya suggests, until 
Kanadoğlu’s novel idea about the meeting quorum, the parliamentary calculations 
were showing that the AKP’s candidate could be elected not in the first and the 
second rounds since the decision quorum was 367 (not the meeting one), but in the 
third and/or the fourth ones, since these latter rounds necessitated the votes of 276, 
less than the total number of the AKP deputies (Özbudun & Gençkaya 2009, p. 
97). Yet, Kanadoğlu’s argument about meeting quorum seemed to have a potential 
to obstruct the process of presidential elections. The idea of Kanadoğlu, which im-
plied that the process could be sent to the Constitutional Court, divided both the 




judicial and political circles. It is not the task of this article to analyze all these legal 
arguments, but it should be suggested that the related articles of the Constitution 
together with the TGNA’s Bylaw were interpreted differently even by the former 
supreme court judges, former Justice Ministers and the law professors (see Milliyet 
2006, p. 18).  
As opposed to the expectations of the late 2006, Erdoğan did not run for 
the office. Instead, one of his comrades from the Milli Görüş, Abdullah Gül, became 
the presidential candidate. The tension between the secularists and Islamists had al-
ready intensified before the elections. For instance, Cumhuriyet Mitingleri (Republican 
Rallies) had been held in order to protest the AKP’s Islamist agenda – as the secular 
circles of the society and the politics believed that it existed – threatening the Re-
public. In a similar vein, the Turkish General Staff released an e-memorandum on 
the night of the first round of the presidential elections. The memorandum empha-
sized the responsibility of the armed forces in the protection of the republican no-
tions, specifically laicism. In other words, it was a warning from the military which 
had shown its uneasiness about the possibility of an Islamist president.  
Far from being surprising, after the first rounds of voting in the parlia-
ment, the CHP, by utilizing the idea of Kanadoğlu, applied to the Constitutional 
Court for the investigation of the voting with regard to the two-third meeting quor-
um. When the Court decided in favor of the application, Abdullah Gül could not be 
elected as the president, leading to a political crisis, which brought about bold 
moves by the AKP. The ruling party decided to make early parliamentary elections 
as well as constitutional amendments that would transform the presidential elections 
from parliamentary voting to popular voting.  
The decision of the Constitutional Court exemplifies well how the state in-
stitutions, the leadership position of which were still dominated by the old cadres, 
challenged the authority of the elected government in the first period of the AKP. 
Köker rightly suggests that the court was allied with the ‘power centers of the estab-
lishment, making it more of a guardian of the state than a constitutional court of 
rights and liberties’, yet with diminishing democratic legitimacy (Köker 2010, p. 
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342). The democratic legitimacy is an important term here, because the simple defi-
nition of the clash between the old and new, in other words, between the secularists 
and conservatives translated itself into a clash between anti-democrats and demo-
crats.  
Undoubtedly, this contrast yielded two positive results for the AKP in the 
conditions of 2007. On the one hand, the AKP augmented its voting rate from 
34.28% to 46.58% in July 2007 general election (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2007). Çarkoğlu 
states that the campaign of AKP was not only based on the thriving economic per-
formance of the government in the last five years, but also on the rhetoric of the 
‘wronged and oppressed’ based on the previous electoral process (Çarkoğlu 2007, p. 
506). In the election manifesto, the party had emphasized the ‘people’ as the source 
of legitimacy, personal freedoms, and democracy, positioning itself against the ‘anti-
democratic forces’ (Seçim Beyannamesi 2007).1 All these parameters; economic 
growth, rhetoric of the oppressed and the discourse of democracy brought a signifi-
cant electoral victory to AKP, which consolidated its power.  
On the other hand, in the same electoral manifesto, the AKP had also 
promised a new civilian constitution, which would include personal freedoms vis-à-
vis the state based on human rights; would clearly define the relationship between 
legislative, executive, and judiciary as the notion of ‘separation of powers’ necessi-
tated in a parliamentary system, and would establish participatory democracy rather 
than the representative one (Seçim Beyannamesi 2007). The manifesto had stressed 
that the ‘separation of powers’ would be organized under the framework of parlia-
mentary form of government. In other words, the AKP, despite its preference over 
presidentialism as suggested above, had not clearly mentioned such a change. Yet 
the next step, October 2007 referendum, which not only amended the meeting 
quorum in the parliament but also brought a change in the presidential elections by 
adopting the popular voting that would start to be implemented by 2014, became a 
significant source for discourse change towards presidential system as would be 
 
1 In the manifesto, there was a statement of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, ‘Millete efendilik etmek yoktur, 
hizmet etmek vardır’ which can be translated as such ‘One should not partronize but serve the peo-
ple,’ implicitly targeting the institutions who were supposedly against the will of the people.   




seen below. In this regard, the AKP government in the 2010s, started to differenti-
ate the president that would be popularly elected than the former ones, although the 
constitutional rights and duties of the president had not been changed yet. As Arat 
and Pamuk suggest, popularly elected president would claim more power based on 
democratic legitimacy, creating a problem of ‘dual legitimacy’ within a parliamentary 
system (Arat & Pamuk 2019, p. 103). 
It should be suggested that the constitutional and political crisis of 2007 
turned into a major victory for AKP. The clash between the secular establishment 
and the old Islamists/new conservatives turned into a binary opposition of demo-
crats and anti-democrats/tutelary powers. It was in this atmosphere that AKP con-
solidated its power for a second term by representing nearly the half of the elec-
torate, and actually made its first serious attempt for a presidential form of govern-
ment although the shift of the discourses from parliamentary to presidential system 
was specified during the constitution making attempt between 2011 and 2013, to 
wit, two legislative period later, as suggested by Bülent Arınç in 2005.   
 
4. Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism: Impasse in the Constitution Making 
Process (2011–2013) 
The clear emphasis on presidentialism reflects well the transformation of 
the AKP’s policies, which were increasingly analyzed in the academic literature 
through the lenses of ‘competitive authoritarianism,’ specifically referring to the pe-
riod after 2013 (see Esen & Gumuscu 2016; Özbudun 2015). What happened in be-
tween is also significant on the way to the evolution of the regime, even though the 
democratization discourse persisted and was embraced by many. In this respect, 
army and the judiciary, which had been the two power centers that created prob-
lems for the AKP, had to face overwhelming changes.   
The military-civilian relations in Turkey had always been a problematic ar-
ea given the frequency of the coups and the interventions that took place in the re-
publican period. In this respect, two major legal cases that targeted military, namely 
the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer), starting with 2008 and 2010 respective-
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ly, tried to change the military’s relationship to politics. These cases were formulated 
based on alleged coup plots by the Kemalist officers who were faced with severe 
sentences and dismissed from the armed forces.  
These trials started a series of discussions on a wide range of topics, from 
civilian control of the armed forces to democratic consolidation. As Ilter Turan 
suggested, all of these trials may have decreased the probability of a military inter-
vention in the future, yet this would not mean democratization of Turkey per se, 
which actually needed compromise among other things (Turan 2010). The results of 
these trials were not about democratic consolidation, but rather about institutional 
weaknesses in two respects. First, since the one-tenth of the Turkish Armed Forces’ 
generals and admirals were arrested during these trials (Gürsoy 2012, p. 736), the 
structural changes that the armed forces experienced were intense. The positions of 
many former officers were filled by the Gülenist soldiers (i.e. called Fetö after 2013, 
meaning Fethullahist Terrorist Organization), who were ideologically religious and 
led the coup attempt of 15th July, 2016. It may well be suggested that these trials ac-
tually paved the way for another junta within the army. Secondly, as Arat and 
Pamuk rightly put it, all these trials weakened also the judiciary given the fact that 
proven irregularities in the process and partisanship of the judges and prosecutors 
with the support of the government shook the legitimacy of this power (Arat & 
Pamuk 2019, p. 106).  
The structure of the judiciary in the meantime had already experienced 
transformations. In 2010, another referendum took place specifically dealing with 
the judiciary. The constitutional amendments, which were accepted by the 57.88% 
of the voters (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2010), restructured higher judiciary, increasing the 
authority of the president in the appointment of the members of the Constitutional 
Court and the HSYK (The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors).  
Referendum included other amendments challenging some of the tutelary structures 
of the 1982 Constitution. Therefore, the protagonists turned the yes vote into sup-




port to democratization,2 placing the opponents automatically on the other camp. 
The then Prime Minister Erdoğan evaluated the results as ‘the festival of democra-
cy’ that the ‘putschists’ lost (CNN Türk 2010). The proponents of the amendments 
had foreseen ‘a significant step forward democratization process,’ (Yazici 2010, p. 
10) yet, the debates around the judiciary did not come to end. On the contrary, 
starting with 2013, the government would start to make more radical changes over 
the judiciary, specifically related to the clash between the government and the 
Gulenists, which had dominated the military, judiciary, and the other state institu-
tions. 
All of these restructuring processes mostly based on the binary opposition 
of democracy vs. tutelage changed its shape and scope in 2011 as constitution-
making stepped into the agenda one more time. The AKP’s promise for a new con-
stitution before 2007 parliamentary elections had not been materialized. Before 
2011 parliamentary elections, however, not only the AKP but also the opposition 
parties pledged to make a new constitution for Turkey. The AKP won the 49.83% 
of the total votes, gaining the 327 of the seats in the parliament (YSK Seçim Arşivi 
2011). Although the election result was a huge success for the AKP, it meant that 
the party needed the support of other parties in order write and submit a new con-
stitution to the electorate (Kubicek 2011, p. 445). Therefore, since all of the parties 
acknowledged the necessity for a new constitution to get rid of the existing one 
mostly associated with the coup of 1982, they formed a commission that would be 
called the Constitutional Conciliation Commission (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, 
AUK) to write a new – and this time civilian – constitution for Turkey.  
As Özpek explains, several issues, such as separation of powers, unitary 
nature of the state, and fundamental rights and liberties, were the potential sources 
for friction between the parties given their different priorities (Özpek 2012, pp. 163-
165). However, it became the system of government problematic that would block 
the negotiations, leading to the failure of the process eventually. In this regard, it is 
 
2 This democratization discourse had also been supported by the liberals, which created the famous 
motto of Yetmez Ama Evet (eng. ‘Yes but not enough’), which became an ongoing debate in Turkey.   
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useful to emphasize specific points over this particular problematic, focusing on the 
debates within the conciliation commission.  
The constitutions of 1961 and 1982 had been written after coup d’états. 
Therefore, all of the parties agreed that both the preparation process and the con-
tent of this civilian constitution should have reflected a broad social consensus. Po-
litical parties outside the TGNA, civil society organizations, universities and media 
were consulted in the process. It is important to note that all these debates have be-
come the first and the last broad-based exchange of views regarding the govern-
ment system. Overall, majority of these participants emphasized the necessity to 
proceed with the parliamentary system (see 1 Nolu Alt Komi̇syon Tutanaklari 2011-
2013).  
On the other hand, deliberations of the university professors almost unan-
imously indicated the contradictions in the existing government system. According 
to them, the major contradiction stemmed from the fact that the rights of the presi-
dent were not compatible with a parliamentary system. Therefore, the position of 
the president had to be brought in compliance with that of a parliamentary system 
(1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013). Another contradiction that was 
pointed out by Prof. Hikmet Sami Türk, the former Justice Minister, was the elec-
tion of the president by popular voting, which was actually a procedure used in 
presidential or semi-presidential systems (1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-
2013, pp. 99-100). Since the majority of the professors preferred strengthening of 
the parliamentary system rather than the adoption of presidentialism, the election 
method was discussed as well. Different suggestions were made. On the one hand, 
some professors supported the reinstation of the parliamentary procedure, un-
doubtedly with particular changes that would prevent a deadlock (1 Nolu Alt 
Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, pp. 142-143). On the other hand, some profes-
sors talked about the possibility of the persistence on the popular voting as long as 
the role of the president were restricted to a ceremonial one, showing the examples 
of Ireland and Austria (1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 357).  




Most of these professors tried to explain their respective positions based 
on both constitutional law and political science. First, the parliament was referred as 
the main source of democratic legitimacy within the historical democratic develop-
ment of Turkey. The presidentialism, which would diminish this legitimacy, was not 
compatible with the historical development of Turkey (e.g., 1 Nolu Alt Komisyon 
Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 294). Second, it was emphasized that presidentialism is 
more open to deadlocks especially when the majority of the parliament and presi-
dent are not from the same party. In other words, passing beyond a deadlock in the 
presidential system is much more difficult given the lack of compromise in the po-
litical culture of Turkey (e.g., 1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 343). 
Last but not least, parliamentarism has been regarded as a more democratic system 
specifically because in the countries where the mechanisms of checks and balances 
have been weak, the presidential system could create uncontrolled arbitrary admin-
istrations, as in the cases of Latin America (e.g., 1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 
2011-2013, p. 357). It is seen that the pros and cons of the systems were deliberated 
in an open-minded fashion in these sub-commissions.  
However, the representatives of the political parties started to clash with 
each other in the writing commissions. As expected, the AKP proposed a constitu-
tion based on presidentialism while the CHP and the MHP (Nationalist Action Par-
ty) were keenly against this proposal. The AKP representatives usually put an em-
phasis on the ‘separation of powers,’ by utilizing the example of the U.S. system. 
The opponents of the presidential system, on the other hand, indicated the differ-
ence between the U.S.A. and Turkey. For instance, the MHP representative, Faruk 
Bal stated that almost all of the countries, which wanted to transform their govern-
ment system similar to the U.S. system turned eventually into dictatorships since the 
system did not work (2 Nolu Yazım Komisyonu Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 307). 
Likewise, the CHP representative Rıza Türmen also explained that Turkey was very 
different from the U.S., in terms of party, parliamentary and administrative struc-
tures, as well as certain freedoms like those of media (2 Nolu Yazım Komisyonu 
Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 359). The two opposition parties were afraid of the con-
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centration of power on the hands of the president, with no proper mechanism of 
checks and balances. Here, it should be noted that the position of the pro-Kurdish 
BDP (The Peace and Democracy Party) was in between. The BDP suggested that 
presidentialism may have been discussed, yet together with the changes in the ad-
ministrative system, referring to more autonomy, or federal structure (e.g., 2 Nolu 
Yazım Komisyonu Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 529). This suggestion for an adminis-
trative change was not appealing to the other parties.  
The constitution making process of Turkey reached an impasse mostly due 
to the discord over the government system. On the one hand, the ruling party AKP 
started to pressurize the process. In addition to the AKP’s insistence on presiden-
tialism, the declarations of Bekir Bozdağ, the then Deputy Prime Minister, implying 
other methods that the party intended to employ to make a constitution in case of a 
failure of the process in 2013 (Anadolu Ajansı 2013) resulted in harsh criticisms in-
side the commission. On the other hand, the effort and necessity to continue to the 
process even if the parties could not agree upon the system of government led to a 
deadlock. This deadlock was not shocking given the fact that the members were try-
ing to write the ‘legislative’ without deciding upon the system of government.  
In 2013, the constitution making process was halted. The AKP had at-
tempted to change the system of government with no success, before the upcoming 
2014 presidential elections that would definitely be a major alteration. As Petersen 
and Yanaşmayan rightly argue that the process failed because ‘comission members 
were unable to overcome their disagreement and deeply rooted political cleavages’ 
(Petersen & Yanaşmayan 2020, p. 50). Among other things that have not been dealt 
with in this article, the parties had two irreconcilable positions towards the system 
of government. However, despite its failure, the analysis of the negotiation process 
is still significant because all of these deliberations reflect the background of the sys-
temic transformation that took place in 2017.  
 
 




5. From Parliamentarism to Presidentialism: The Transformation of the Sys-
tem in Turkey  
2013, in which the Constitutional Conciliation Commission was officially 
dissolved, became an eventful year for Turkey. First, the decision to construct a 
shopping mall in Gezi Park, one of the last green places left in central Istanbul, led 
to widespread protests all over Turkey. The protests, which started with environ-
mental concerns, turned into anti-government demonstrations. As Yardımcı-
Geyikçi rightly puts, the expansion of the protests was closely related to the intensi-
fication of the social unrest and the political polarization inside the country, long 
before 2013 (Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2014, p. 445). Regardless of the reasons, it may well 
be suggested that the harsh reaction of the police towards the protesters became a 
real turning point about the perception of the government.  
Another important political development of 2013 was the dissociation be-
tween the AKP and Gülen network. It was concretely revealed by the December 
2013 corruption allegations directed against several ministers by the members of 
this network, who had been very active specifically in the institutions of education, 
justice and security, including the army. Therefore, the clash between these groups 
created a fight within the state. This fight which was mostly stemmed from the 
power-sharing resulted in further empowerment of the executive particularly vis-à-
vis the judiciary, as a result of the radical changes within bureaucracy (Arat & 
Pamuk 2019, pp. 112-113).  
It was in this political landscape that Turkey held its presidential elections, 
for the first time by popular voting based on the 2007 referendum’s result. The then 
Prime Minister Erdoğan won the elections in the first round by the 51.79% of the 
votes (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2014), appealing to more or less half of the electorate. In 
addition to the 2007 referendum and the failed constitution making process of 
2011–2013, the 2014 presidential elections became another turning point on the 
way to the presidential system. The fact that Erdoğan had already declared that he 
would not be a neutral president despite the impartiality clause of the constitution 
during the electoral campaign and acted accordingly after the elections resulted in a 
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system debate, which indicated that presidentialism à la Turca was on the way 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2015, pp. 172-173). It should be emphasized that until 2017 referen-
dum that changed the system of government, Turkey was actually ruled by a de facto 
presidential system that President Erdoğan became the dominant persona who took 
the decisions and expected the then Prime Minister Davutoğlu to execute them.  
However, despite the implementation of ‘de facto’ presidentialism, the sit-
uation could not be sustainable in the long run either, given the clear principles of 
the constitution. As a result, before the 2015 parliamentary election, the AKP, one 
more time, promised a new constitution in its election manifesto. According to the 
document, the AKP had cleansed the tutelary nature of the presidency with 2007, 
thus the division of the duties and responsibilities should have been made accord-
ingly (Seçim Beyannamesi 2015, p. 41). In this way, administration would overcome 
the possibility of a deadlock between the President and Prime Minister on the one 
hand and would be faster and more effective on the other hand (Seçim Beyanna-
mesi 2015, pp. 40-41). The effectiveness, in this sense, turned into a key term re-
garding the quest for more power.  
However, the AKP, although became the first party in the elections, could 
not get the seats needed to form one party government in June 2015, as a radically 
different situation from the previous elections. The coalition building process of the 
AKP failed although the task was not given to the CHP or any other opposition 
party, to wit, ‘an election result was ignored’ for the first time in the history of the 
Turkish competitive politics, leading to the snap elections of November 2015 
(Öktem & Akkoyunlu 2016, p. 471).  
At this point, it should be noted that the November 2015 election took 
place in a highly polarized and insecure political and social environment. On the 
one hand, already halting Kurdish peace process came to an end. The escalation of 
war with the PKK in Southeastern Anatolia resulted both in a sharp decrease in the 
popularity of the HDP (People’s Democratic Party) which had become successful 
in June 2015 and in a highly polarized political atmosphere (Grigoriadis 2016). On 
the other hand, Turkey had to deal with terrorism also in the big cities throughout 




the summer and autumn of 2015, owing to the ISIS attacks. In this highly fragile 
atmosphere that the AKP increased its votes to 49.5% from the previous 40.8%, 
taking the majority in the parliament back (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2015). Kalaycıoğlu 
explains the result based on the aforementioned political instability which ‘seemed 
to reinforce the image that coalition government formation and good governance 
were not necessarily correlated’ (Kalaycıoğlu 2018, p. 31). 
After the snap election, President Erdoğan reiterated his position about 
presidentialism and summoned the other parties to make a new constitution (Sözcü 
2015), since the seats of the AKP in the parliament fell short of making constitution 
or holding a referendum for a draft. Although there was not any positive answer to 
the call at that point, another Constitution Conciliation Commission in the parlia-
ment was convened in early 2016. Actually, this commission was doomed to fail 
from the beginning given the extreme polarization between the political parties in 
the conditions of 2016. Therefore, after few sessions, the commission was disband-
ed since the main opposition party CHP adamantly refused to discuss anything re-
lated the presidential system (BBC Türkçe 2016a).  
Within the existing rules and regulations, the AKP had nothing but to pre-
pare its own draft, then to seek support from parliament for referendum. However, 
July 2016 coup attempt, which was undertaken by the Gülenist factions of the army, 
absolutely changed the political scene in Turkey. To analyze the coup attempt goes 
beyond the scope of this article. But it should be noted that the post 15th July period 
in Turkey brought massive waves of purge of Fetö members alongside a long-term 
state of emergency. It is in this state of emergency conditions that the leader of the 
MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, declared his support to bring the constitutional amendments 
that mostly aimed at the transformation of the government system to the parlia-
ment. In the conditions of the late 2016, the presidentialism was discussed based on 
the need to form a system that would provide ‘constant powerful political will’ in 
Turkey (BBC Türkçe 2016b).  
So, what kind of presidential system could the AKP bring to the parlia-
ment, after years of efforts, debates and negotiations? Özsoy Boyunsuz justifiably 
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argues that the proposal of this ‘Turkish type of presidentialism’ could be classified 
as ‘hyper presidentialism’ in which the executive is overpowered at the expense of 
the legislative and judiciary, with little balance of power mechanisms and no separa-
tion of powers (Özsoy Boyunsuz 2016). Therefore, the proposed Turkish type of 
presidentialism has had more resemblances with the Latin American government 
systems than that of the U.S., which had been incessantly shown as an example in 
the discussions of 2004–2005 and in the sessions of the Constitutional Conciliation 
Commissions between 2011 and 2013, in order to aggrandize presidentialism, and 
its separation of powers. While lacking checks and balances, the amendments par-
ticularly weakened the legislative since the president gained the right to dissolve the 
assembly and to issue decrees having the force of legislation in specific realms with-
out parliamentary control (Özsoy Boyunsuz 2016, p. 84). Actually, the amendments 
set forth little or no parliamentary control for any actions of the executive body.  
The proposal was accepted for referendum in the parliament with the sup-
port of the MHP deputies. During the campaign period, the AKP emphasized 
‘power, stability and effectiveness’ (Anadolu Ajansı 2017) compatible with the zeit-
geist while the opposition party CHP tried to explain that the amendments were 
changing not just the system but the regime. The constitutional amendments were 
accepted in the referendum held in April 2017, with the 51.4% of votes, confirming 
the polarization, to wit, the division in the society that took shape through the 
2010s (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2017). After years of debates based on democratization 
and the U.S. type of presidentialism, Turkey’s a-century-long parliamentary system 
eventually changed into a presidential one with the features of hyper-
presidentialism, within an increasingly authoritarian setting.  
 
6. In lieu of conclusion  
When this article was written in 2020, the politicians in Turkey were still 
discussing the recently changed system of government. Apart from the usual oppo-
nents of presidentialism, such as the CHP or the HDP; it is remarkable to see that 
even the former Prime Minister of the AKP, Davutoğlu, who ardently defended 




presidential system during his tenure, were conducting campaign for parliamentar-
ism with his new party (Cumhuriyet 2020). This acknowledges, on the one hand, 
that the current hyper-presidentialism restricts political space for all of the actors 
and the parties other than Erdoğan or the AKP. On the other hand, it shows that 
the transformation of the system in 2017 did not (and will not) end the discussions 
around it.  
Accordingly, this study aimed to show that the system of government has 
always been discussed since the late 20th century. Different actors have kept the 
matter on the agenda with different impetuses. From efficiency to the drive to over-
come instability; different discourses have been adopted. This article argued that the 
debates on the system of government is not intrinsic to the authoritarianism of the 
recent period, though particularly emphasizing that it was this authoritarian turn in 
Turkey that shaped the features of the system as eventually accepted in 2017. The 
excessive power of the executive with no proper checks and balances yet with a 
highly politicized justice system is directly related to rising authoritarianism in Turk-
ish politics. Surely, it was not possible to handle such a massive change either in the 
late 20th century or in the first decade of the AKP rule since the other institutions of 
the state were strong in the face of the respective governments. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that this change could take place in the 2010s that the AKP dominated 
the other institutions.   
However, as this article showed, the presidential system was thought as an 
option, even in the conditions of 2004 and 2005 with a different discourse. This was 
a good reflection of a common political attitude in Turkey that has usually – and 
wrongly – regarded the government system change as a panacea to the flaws of the 
Turkish politics. In this respect, it is possible to follow not only the basic paradigms 
but also the problems of the (sub)periods in Turkey on the debates associated with 
presidentialism; as could be seen in the evolution of discourses from democratiza-
tion to the quest for more power.  
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